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STATUTES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1990): 
Section 38-1-7: Notice of claim - contents -
recording - service on owner of property. 
(1) Each contractor or other person who 
claims the benefit of this chapter within 80 
days after substantial completion of the 
project or improvement shall file for record 
with the county recorder of the county in 
which the property, or some part of the 
property, is situated, a written notice to 
hold and claim a lien. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement 
setting forth the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if 
known or, if not known, the name of the 
record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he 
was employed or to whom he furnished the 
equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last 
labor or service was performed or the first 
and last equipment or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, 
sufficient for identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant 
or his authorized agent and an 
acknowledgment or certificate as required 
under Chapter 3, Title 57. No 
acknowledgment or certificate is required 
for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, 
and before April 24, 1989. 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice 
of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or 
mail by certified mail to either the reputed 
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owner or record owner of the real property a 
copy of the notice of liens. If the record 
'•owner's current address is not readily 
available, the copy of the claim may be 
mailed to the last-known address of the 
record owner, using the names and addresses 
appearing on the last completed real 
property assessment rolls of the county 
where the affected property is located. 
Failure to deliver or mail the notice of 
lien to the reputed owner or record owner 
precludes the lien claimant from an award of 
costs and attorneys' fees against the 
reputed owner or record owner in -•• i-~ 
to enforce the lien. 
-' - - s pendens 
- Action : .; aei.t dttec'ea. 
Actions •„ enioice cne ^eiib herein provided 
for must be begun within twelve months aftei 
the completion of the original contract, cr 
the suspension of work thereunder for a 
period of thirty days. Within the twelve 
months herein mentioned the lien claimant 
shall file for record with the county 
recorder of each county i n wiii ch the 1 i ei 1 is 
recorded a notice of the pendency of the 
action, in the manner provided in actions 
affecting the title or right to possession 
of real property, or the lien shall be void, 
except as to persons who have been made 
parties to the action, and persons having 
actual knowledge of the commencement of the 
action, and the burden of proof shall be 
upon the ] ien claimant and those claiming 
under him to show such actual knowledge. 
Nothing herein contained shall be construed 
to impair or affect the right of any person 
to whom a debt may be due for any work done 
or materials furnished to maintain a 
persona] action to recover the same. 
S e c • . . .- »f 
c o n t e n t s nieapi te d e f e c t s . 
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A recorded document imparts notice of its 
contents regardless of any defect, 
irregularity, or omission in its execution, 
attestation, or acknowledgment. A certified 
copy of a recorded document is admissible as 
evidence to the same extent the original 
document would be admissible as evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Butterfield does not dispute Peterson Mortgage's 
Statement of the Case set out in its Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Butterfield Lumber supplied materials to 
residential property located in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. Delivery of the materials commenced on January 8, 1987 
and the last materials were delivered on April 10, 1987. 
(R. at p. 237). 
2. The value of the lienable materials supplied to 
the property was $4,043.80. Butterfield Lumber was not paid 
for the materials supplied and filed a Notice of Lien on June 
18, 1987. (R. at p. 35). 
3. Butterfield filed an action to foreclose its lien 
on April 6, 1988. (R. at p. 238). 
4. Peterson Mortgage received actual notice of the 
commencement of Butterfield1s lien foreclosure on April 9, 
1988. (R. at p. 16) . 
5. Peterson Mortgage held a trustee's sale on or 
about August 15, 1988. The property was sold by Peterson 
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Mortgage to its president, Leon Peterson, an individual. 
(R. at pp. 238-39). 
6. Leon Peterson sold the property to a third 
party. (R. at p. 239). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 1: Peterson Mortgage had actual notice of 
Butterfield Lumber's action to foreclose its mechanic's lien. 
Section 38-1-11 does not require the recordation of a lis 
pendens if a party to be charged with the lien has actual 
notice of the action. The sale of the property by Peterson 
Mortgage's president does not render Butterfield Lumber's lien 
unenforceable. 
ARGUMENT 2: Butterfield Lumber's Notice of Lien is 
valid pursuant to Section 38-l-7(e), Utah Code Ann. (1990), and 
does not require an acknowledgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED BUTTERFIELD 
JUDGMENT ON ITS MECHANIC'S LIEN 
A. Peterson Mortgage had Actual Notice of 
Butterfield's Mechanic's Lien Foreclosure. 
Peterson Mortgage acknowledges it had proper and 
actual knowledge of Butterfield Lumber's action to foreclose 
its lien. A Summons and Complaint was served upon Peterson 
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Mortgage on or about April 7, 1988 (Record at p. 15). The 
timely issuance and service of the Summons and Complaint gave 
Peterson Mortgage actual notice of Butterfield Lumber's lien 
foreclosure. 
All parties with actual notice of a mechanic's lien 
foreclosure action are subject to a valid lien. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-11 (1990). In fact, Peterson Mortgage highlights this 
fact in its Brief (Brief at p. 11). As a party with actual 
notice of Butterfield Lumber's lien foreclosure action, 
Peterson Mortgage is subject to judicial enforcement of 
Butterfield Lumber's lien. 
The requirement of a lis pendens set forth in § 38-1-7 
protects an innocent purchaser who has neither actual nor 
constructive notice of a lien or a lien foreclosure action. 
That protection, however, does not extend to those parties with 
actual notice of the action. The clear statutory language 
preserves Butterfield Lumber's lien rights against Peterson 
Mortgage. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Harris-Dudley 
Plumbing Co. v. Professional United World Travel Association, 
592 P.2d 586 (Utah 1979), is controlling. In Harris-Dudley, 
the plaintiff sought foreclosure of a mechanic's lien, in spite 
of the fact that the plaintiff had failed to file a lis pendens 
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on one parcel included in the foreclosure action. As in the 
instant case, after the initiation of the foreclosure action, 
the subject property was conveyed. Notwithstanding the absence 
of a lis pendens, the trial court granted a judgment of 
foreclosure against the new corporate owner of the subject 
property, finding it had actual notice of the foreclosure 
action, ^d. at 588. 
In affirming the trial court, the Court held: 
It is true as defendants argue that Section 
38-1-11, U.C.A., 1953, requires that a 
notice of lis pendens be filed within one 
year or the lien is void. But defendants 
ignore the exception contained in that 
section that the lien would not be void as 
to 'persons who have been made parties to 
the action and persons having actual 
knowledge of the commencement of the action. 
Id. As was the case in Harris-Dudley, Peterson Mortgage 
Mortgage was a party to the foreclosure action and is subject 
to Butterfield Lumber's lien. 
Utah is not alone in recognizing this well-established 
rule. In a factually similar case, Wallich Lumber Company v. 
Golds, 375 Mich. 323, 134 N.W.2d 722 (1965), the Michigan 
Supreme Court determined that the absence of a lis pendens does 
not affect parties with actual notice of a mechanic's lien 
foreclosure action. As in Utah, the Michigan statute required 
the commencement of an action and the filing of a lis pendens. 
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The trial court had found that the plaintiff's mechanic's lien 
was invalid because the plaintiff had not filed a lis pendens. 
Reversing the lower court's decision, the Michigan 
Supreme Court held that, as to parties with actual notice, a 
lis pendens is not required. The court stated: 
Once a lien attaches, a liberal construction 
should be made of the statute because of its 
remedial character, [citations omitted.] A 
liberal construction is achieved by holding 
that the lis pendens need not be filed as to 
those who have actual notice of the suit. 
To hold otherwise would exalt constructive 
notice over actual notice. [citations 
omitted.] The trial judge was in error. 
The filing of a lis pendens was unnecessary 
as to defendants who had notice of the lien 
and were sued and served within the one-year 
period. 
134 N.W.2d at 724. 
An early Idaho decision explained the rationale for a 
lis pendens requirement. It stated that a lis pendens "is 
necessary only for the purpose of giving record notice to 
subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of property who have no 
actual knowledge of the action or claim upon which it is 
based." Smith v. Faris-Kesl Construction Co., 27 Idaho 407, 
150 P. 25, 32 (1915). See also, Collins v. Stockwell, 137 
Ariz. 437, 671 P.2d 415, 418 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). ("No one 
suggests that a lien on which a timely foreclosure is begun, 
but no lis pendens is filed, ceases to become a lien as to all 
persons with actual notice thereof.") 
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13. Butterfield Lumber's Lien Attaches to the 
Proceeds of Peterson Mortgage's Sale of the 
Property. 
Peterson Mortgage admits that it was a party with 
actual notice of Butterfield Lumber's foreclosure action. 
Peterson Mortgage now claims that its sale of the property, 
after being joined as a party to the foreclosure action, 
extinguishes Butterfield Lumber's lien. Significantly, 
Peterson Mortgage is unable to cite any legal or statutory 
authority for its novel proposition. 
Peterson Mortgage's argument would erode the validity 
and value of liens generally, and is contrary to fundamental 
equity principles. The general statement of the law, as it 
applies to lieAS, is set forth in 51 Am.Jur.2d § 60: 
It is a principle of equity that one who has 
a lieA upon property which is wrongfully 
converted by another, with notice of the 
lien, may have his lien fixed upon the 
proceeds of the property where the lien upon 
the property has thus been destroyed by the 
wrongdoer. Thus, if the owner of property, 
real or personal, upon which another has a 
lien disposes of it to an innocent purchaser 
for value who is protected from the lien, 
the lienor has a right to have the lien 
transferred to the proceeds of the property. 
Peterson's action in foreclosing its junior interest 
and then conveying the property does not allow it to avoid 
Butterfield Lumber's lien. The lien attaches to the proceeds 
of the sale. 
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Courts have recognized this principle in a variety of 
circumstances. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court held: 
It is well understood that when a person has 
a lien on land or other property and the 
holder of the legal title disposes of it to 
one who is an innocent purchaser for value 
and protected against such lien, the 
lienholder has the right in equity to have 
the court transfer his lien to what is 
received as the consideration for the sale 
thereby lifting his lien from the land or 
other property. 
Morgan Plan Co. v. Bruce, 266 Ala. 494, 497, 97 So.2d 805, 808 
(1957). 
In finding that a lienholder may follow the lien to 
the proceeds, the Alabama court determined that the person 
selling the property holds the proceeds in trust for the 
benefit of the lienholder. See also, In re Tazewell County 
Collector, 130 111. App. 3d. 77, 473 N.E.2d 1013, 1014 (1985) 
("A lien on property follows the property if moved, unless it 
was sold to an innocent purchaser, in which case the lien 
follows the proceeds of the sale."); Farmer's Feed & Supply v. 
Industrial Leasing, 286 Or. 311, 317, 594 P.2d 397, 400 (1979) 
("Where the owner of lien-subject property wrongfully disposes 
of it, the proceeds stand in the place of the property sold. 
In such cases, where equity jurisdiction attaches, the court 
will dispose of the entire controversy and render a money 
judgment.") 
-10-
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April 24, 19 89," and instituted an acknowledgment requirement 
for liens filed subsequent to April 24, 1989 (emphasis 
supplied). Butterfield Lumber's lien was clearly filed within 
the period in which no acknowledgment was required. 
The recording statutes themselves provide an 
additional basis for denying Peterson's appeal. Section 
57-4a-2, Utah Code Ann. (1990), discusses defective or omitted 
acknowledgments. The statute provides: 
A recorded document imparts notice of its 
contents regardless of any defect, 
irregularity, or omission in its execution, 
attestation or acknowledgment. 
The purpose of the recording statute is to give notice 
of documents, not to validate them. 
In conclusion, there is no applicable authority which 
invalidates Butterfield Lumber's lien. The trial court 
properly denied Peterson's Motion to Dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Butterfield Lumber held a valid, perfected lien 
against the real property described in its Notice of Lien. 
Peterson Mortgage had actual notice of the lien foreclosure 
action filed by Butterfield Lumber. Peterson Mortgage sold the 
Property to its president, Leon Peterson, at the trustee's 
sale. When Leon Peterson conveyed the Property to a bona fide 
purchaser, Butterfield Lumber's lien was transferred to the 
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